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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
INC., a CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HENRY E. WEST, JR., d/b/a 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The action in the lower Court was brought by the as-
signee of a written contract who commenced suit against 
Defendant for breach of said contract and for Defendant's 
insufficient funds check. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Default Judgment was granted against Defendant in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. The 
Defendant moved to set the Default Judgment aside. The 
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said Court, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow presiding, 
denied the motion. 
The Appellant-Defendant seeks to have the Default 
Judgment set aside and be granted opportunity to present 
his defense which he believes to be meritorious and legally 
sufficient. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After commencement of the Plaintiff's action in the 
spring of 1965, Defendant engaged James A. Murphy of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as his counsel. Plaintiff was repre-
sented by Robert M. McRae of Salt Lake City, Utah. McRae 
withdrew as counsel for Plaintiff on or about October 13, 
1965, and Ephraim H. Fankhauser became counsel for Plain-
tiff. Murphy entered Defendant's answer to Plaintiff's Com-
plaint about February 4, 1966. 
Fankhauser served Interrogartories on Defendant 
about October 10, 1966. Three days later, on October 13, 
1966, Murphy withdrew as counsel for Defendant and so 
notified Fankhauser and sent notice of his withdrawal to 
Defendant at Defendant's last business address, 530 East 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant had, however, 
previously terminated his employment at that address and 
did not receive the notice, and had not receved it or the In-
terrogatories prior to November 28, 1966. Plaintiff's coun-
sel, Fankhauser, who knew that Defendant's counsel, 
Murphy, had withdrawn, did not send Defendant a written 
notice requiring Defendant to appoint another counsel or 
appear in person as required by statue. U.C.A. 78-51-36 
(1953). 
Without further notice or communication to Defendant, 
E. H. Fankhauser, on or about November 16, 1966, filed a 
Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and enter a Default 
Judgment against Defendant and a Notice of Hearing on 
said motion. The ground for said motion was that Defendant 
had not answered the said Interrogatories of October 10, 
1966. Fankhouser mailed a copy of said motion and notice 
to 530 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, which was 
the address at which Defendant had been previously only an 
employee, but from which Defendant had then moved and 
the copy of motion and notice was never delivered or for-
warded to Defendant. 
On November 28, 1966, the Third District Court, the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, made an order 
striking Defendant's answer and granting Default Judgment 
against Defendant. The said Judgment provides for puni-
tive damages inasmuch as Plaintiff's Complaint prays for 
such damage. Neither Defendant nor his counsel were pres-
ent at these proceedings and were wholly ignorant of the 
action at that time. Defendant engaged other counsel, 
Stephen M. Hadley, who after learning about the Default 
Judgment, on December 20, 1966, contacted E. H. Fank-
hauser who agreed in writing to stipulate that the Court 
could set the Default Judgment aside. 
Defendant's counsel accordingly prepared a stipulation 
as per the above said agreement to set the Default aside, but 
on January 9, 1967, E. H. Fankhauser notified Stephen M. 
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Hadley that Fankhauser's client, the Plaintiff, would not 
allow him to so stipulate. Defendant's counsel then filed a 
motion to set the Default Judgment aside, which motion was 
heard by the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, on May 4, 1967. 
The said Court denied the motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN NOT SETTING DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ASIDE WHEN IT WAS INFORMED THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD NOT DEMANDED THAT DEFENDANT APPOINT 
NEW COUNSEL OR APPEAR IN PERSON AS PLAIN-
TIFF WAS REQUIRED TO DO BY A MANDATORY 
STATUTE 'WHEN PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNSEL HAD PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN. 
Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) reads as follows: 
When an attorney ... seases to act as such, a party 
to an action or proceeding for whom he was acting 
as attorney must before any further proceedings are 
had against him be required by the adverse party by 
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to ap-
pear in person. 
The obvious intent of the statute is to prevent one party 
who is represented by counsel from taking unjust advantage 
of the other party who may believe that he is also repre-
sented by counsel when in fact he is not, or who may be 
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ignorant of necessary legal procedure. In other words, the 
statute requires the one party to notify the other prior to 
taking further action. There is no specific requirements as 
to the type or form of the notice except that it be written. 
Certainly this is not such an onerous burden that its neglect 
can be excused in view of its obvious benefit to a party who 
may be ignorant of his rights and proper legal procedure or 
who may be ignorant that he is not then represented. More-
over, such notice would be of advantage to the one giving it 
in that it would add some invulnerability to a Judgment 
obtained after giving such notice. 
In the instant case it is without contradiction that the 
Plaintiff did not give Defendant the required notice and 
that Defendant was wholly ignorant of the default hearing. 
Defendant states in his affidavit that he in fact did not 
have notice of the hearing and that he had not then received 
or heard of the interrogatories upon which the judgment 
was based. In addition, Defendant has previously moved 
from the address to which the copies of said motion and 
hearing were sent and said papers were never sent or for-
warded on to Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel had 
received the notice that Defendant's former counsel had 
withdrawn more than one month previous to the sending of 
the copy of said motion for default judgment. 
This case clearly appears to be one to which the statute 
was designed to apply. It is submitted that the lower court 
erred in not ruling that default judgment was not proper 
when it appeared that the Plaintiff had not complied with 
the above statute. 
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POINT II. 
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIC-
IAL ERROR IN SUSTAINING AWARD OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES IN ABSENCE OF PROOF THEREOF WHEN 
IT UPHELD DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES ARE THE SAME AS EXEMPLARY 
DAMAGES WHICH MUST BE PROVED. 
The plaintiff's Second Cause of Action includes a pray-
er for punitive damages based on an allegation of Defend-
ant's fraud. Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
section (b) (2) requires the court to take proof of the value 
of a claim for unliquidated damages. It is submitted that at-
torney fees, punitive or exemplary damages, or defination of 
unliquidated damages. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 Pac. 
908, requires the court to take proof of unliquidated 
damages. 
Although there are very few cases found on this point, 
the Colorado Supreme Court in Valdez v. Sams, 307 P.2d 
189, 191 ( 1957), stated that 
Exemplary damages ... cannot be awarded in the 
absence of a specific finding, based upon evidence, 
that the special circumstances which warrant the 
extraordinary remedy were in fact present. 
Under the circumstances of this case, it is submitted that the 
rule as laid down by the Colorado Court is good law and is 




THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN FAILING TO SET DEF'AULT JUDGMENT 
ASIDE BASED ON DEFENDANT'S FAIL URE TO AN-
SWER PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATORIES BECAUSE 
SUCH GROUND IS TECHNICAL RATHER THAN SUB-
STANTIAL. 
This Court has many times stated that Default judg-
ments should be set aside if justice requires. In McKean v. 
Mountain View Memorial Estates, 17 Utah 2d 323, 325, 411 
P.2d 128 (1966), the Court stated that 
it is the policy of the law to favor a trial on the 
merits and to afford both sides a full opportunity to 
present their evidence and contentions as to disputed 
issues so they may be disposed of on substantial rath-
er than on technical grounds. 
In this case the counsel for Plaintiff agreed to set the De-
fault Judgment aside, but then later refused to honor his 
agreement on the ground that his client, the Plaintiff, would 
not allow him to do so. Further, it is without contradiction 
that Defendant's present counsel acted with reasonable dis-
patch to protect Defendant's rights after he was engaged by 
Defendant. The Plaintiff's counsel was aware that Defend-
ant might not have received notice of the motion for Judg-
ment and the Notice of Hearing of the same, and said coun-
sel also knew that Defendant's former counsel had with-
drawn. 
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It is also without dispute that Defendant had not re-
ceived the Interrogatories on which the judgment was based. 
Thus, it would seem that such a ground for a Default Judg-
ment is technical and not substantial and therefore is in 
direct opposition to this Court's avowed policy. 
POINT IV. 
THAT LOWER COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN FAILING TO SET DEF AULT JUDGMENT 
ASIDE \VHEN DEFENDANT TESTIFIED BY AFFI-
DAVIT THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT IN FACT HAVE 
NOICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF DEF AULT HEARING. 
It is uncontracicted that Defendant did not have knowl-
edge of the notice of the Default hearing nor of the hearing 
itself, and that he was not represented by counsel at the 
time. Moreover, it is clear that Plaintiff's counsel had knowl-
edge of these facts. Since Defendant's Affidavit stands un-
contradicted the Court must conclude that notice by the De-
fendant was not in fact received and since an answer was 
previously interposed, Default Judgment was clearly 
improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower Court not to set the Judgment 
aside is manifest error and should be reversed in the inter-
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ests of justice to allow the Defendant to have his day in 
Court and present evidence which he feels is meritorious and 
legally sufficient. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RIGTRUP, HADLEY, LIVINGSTON & NEWMAN 
Stephen M. Hadley 
530 East Fifth South, Suite No. 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Counsel for Appellant 
14 
of the defendant and was never returned to plaintiff~s 
counsel thus giving rise to the presumption that de-
fendant did, in fact, have notice. It is also uncontradicted 
that the Notice of Default Judgment mailed to the de-
f cndant at his last known address, 530 East 5th South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah was, in fact, received by defendant. 
The record clearly supports the action of the trial court 
and the judgment against the defendant was proper 
as well as the denial of defendants motion to set aside the 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower Court denying defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was proper for plain-
tiff was under no requirement to serve notice upon 
defendant to appoint new counsel or in the alternative, 
to appear in person, for the withdrawal of his former 
attorney was a voluntary withdrawal, and not a with-
drawal contemplated under the provisions of 78-51-36, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the record before the 
Court at the time of hearing of defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment was sufficient to sustain the 
Judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff against de-
fendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. H. Fankhauser 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Counsel for Respondant 
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of the trial court in granting the judgment against de-
fendant and denying the Motion of the defendant to set 
the judgment aside. 
POINT IV. 
LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF 
PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT WHERE 
SUCH MOTION WAS BASED UPON THE AFFI-
DAVIT OF DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD NO NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DE-
F AULT HEARING. 
Defendant in his Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment of plaintiff against defendant based such mo-
tion on the failure of plaintiff to comply with the pro-
visions of Section 78-51-36 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The withdrawal of defendant's counsel, Mr. Murphy, was 
voluntary and not a withdrawal contemplated or within 
the meaning of the statute relied upon by the defendant 
in the bringing of his motion to set the judgment aside. 
Further, the defendant admitted in his affidavit in sup-
port of his motion that he received the notice of with-
drawal of Mr. Murphy. Under these circumstances the 
lower court had no alternative but to deny defendant's 
motion absent a showing of abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court in granting the default judgment, 
or that the action of the trial court was not supported 
by the record. 
It is uncontradicted that the Motion of Plaintiff to 
take Default Judgment against the defendant and Notice 
of Hearing thereon was mailed to the last known address 
12 
the answer of the defendant and entering a Default 
Judgment against defendant, and did so properly. 
In Titcker Realty Inc., t'. Nunley, lG U. (2d) 97, 396 
Pac. 2d 410 (19G4) this court stated as follows: 
"We first note the basic premisf~ on appeal: that 
the Judgment is presumed to be correct, and that 
the burden of establishing its invalidity is upon 
the party attacking it. Inasmuch as no transcript 
of what transpired before the trial court ... has 
been brought to us, it is to be presumed that the 
preceeding supports the Judgment." 
rr'his court in upholding the action of the trial court in 
the Tucker Realty Inc., case (supra) recognized that the 
granting of a judgment against a party solely for failure 
to cooperate in discovery procedure was a stringent 
measure. This court also recognized that the question 
of whether the failure to comply with the discovery pro-
cedure was wilfnl and such as to justify the action taken 
is primarily for tlw trial court to determine; and unless 
it is shovrn that the court abused its discretion or its 
action is without support the judgment should not be 
disturbed. The defendant has made no showing that 
the trial court ahnsed its disgression under the provi-
sions of Rule 37 ( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
or that its action was without support in granting judg-
ment to the plaintiff inasmuch as no transcript of what 
transpired before the trial court on November 29, 1966, 
has ber~n brought before this court. Absent such a show-
ing th<) ;jndgrm~nt on appeal should not be disturbed. 
rrhe record before the court clearly sustains the actionf' 
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visions of Rule 55(b) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure were not applicable, as contended by de-
fendant. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO ANSWER IN-
TERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY PLAINTIFF 
AS PRESCRIBED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Defendant urges under point 3 of his brief that 
the lower court committed error in failing to set the 
Default Judgment against defendant aside in that the 
basis upon which such judgment was granted is technical 
rather than substantial. Nowhere in the pleadings certi-
fied for record, more particularly defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment, has defendant raised 
the issue which he seeks to raise here. As a general rule, 
grounds of defense or opposition not asserted and relied 
on in the lower court will not be considered or given 
any weight on review. 
It is undisputed in the record that the defendant 
was served properly with Interrogatories under Rule 33 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that defendant 
failed to answer them within the time prescribed. Fur-
ther, defendant in his Motion to Set Aside the Default 
.Judgment proceeded under section 78-51-36 of the Utah 
Code as opposed to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The trial court proceeded under Rule 
37 ( d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in striking 
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damages. 
As a general rule, punitive or exemplary damages 
are awarded in addition to actual or compensatory dam-
ages and are in nature a punishment for the wrong done 
by the defendant, and in cases of fraud or deceit, puni-
tive or exemplary damages can be assessed in addition 
to actual damages. (24 Am Jur. Fraud and Deceit S 222). 
Awards of punitive damages have been allowed and 
recognized by the Utah Courts ,and it is only when an 
award of punitive damages is disproporitionate to the 
award of actual damages will the court refuse to sustain 
such an award. (Nance et al v. Sheet Metal Workers 
International Association, 12 U. (2d) 233, 3G4 P. 2d 1027) 
The defendant does not contend that the award of 
punitive damages was disproportionate to the claim of 
plaintiff in its Second Cause of Action. Nor has defend-
ant shown, in the record before the Court, that the lower 
Court did not comply with law in assessing damages 
against defendant. In a case of a Default Judgment 
where the action is for unliquidated damages, presump-
tion on appeal, in absence of showing to the contrary, 
iE that the Court below complied with law and properly 
assessed the damages. (lValker Brothers v. Continental 
Insitrance Co. of New York, 2 Ut. 331). The lower court 
proceeded properly under Rules 55(a) (1) and 55(b) (1) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in awarding puni-
tive damages against defendant in that the claim of 
plaintiff was for a sum certain and was supported by 
written instrurneuts. Under these circumstances the pro-
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POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT 
OF PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHEN 
IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST 
DEFENDANT. 
Defendant, for the first time in the proceedings 
of the case before the court, seeks to attack the judgment 
against defendant, pursuant to plaintiff's Second Cause 
of Action, specifically the award of punitive damages, 
as being improper. Defendant did not raise this issue in 
his Motion to Set Aside the Judgment of plaintiff against 
defendant, nor was this issue raised in defendant's An-
swer to plaintiff's Complaint. Thus it would appear that 
the defendant waived this particular issue under rules 
S(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
under familiar principles of appellant review, a point or 
issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
(Tigeson vs. JJ!agna Water Co., 13 U. (2nd) 397, 375 P. 
2nd 456.) 
Defendant contends Rule 55(b) (2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure requires that the Court must take 
proof of the value of a claim for unliquidated damages; 
and that punitive or exemplary damages are within the 
definition of unliquidated damages. As authority for this 
position defendant cites the Utah case of Hurd v. Ford, 
74 Utah 46, 276 pac. 908. A reading of the case cited 
by defendant in support of his contention reveals that the 
rnle set down by the Utah Spreme Court applies to ac-
tions for reasonable value of attorney's services and 
has no application to an award of punitive or exemplary 
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The action before the Court was commenced against 
defendant on or about June 21, l9G5. Numerous exten-
sions were afforded to defendant, by and through 
his then counsel, Mr. l\Iurphy, by both plaintiff's attor-
neys, Mr. McRae and Mr. Fankhauser, in which to file 
his answer to the Complaint, of plaintiff. The Answer 
of defendant to plaintiff's Complaint was filed by Mr. 
Murphy on or about February 7, 1966, only after Mr. 
Murphy was given ample opportunity to examine all 
documents in writing upon which plaintiff's action was 
based. The withdrawal of l\Ir. Murphy came at precisely 
the time plaintiff attempted to put the case at issue 
and to reach a termination of the long pending litigation 
by serving Interrogatories upon defondant. This situa-
tion clearly appears to be one that would come within 
the contemplation of the Utah Court in deciding the 
\/anCott v. Wall case (Supra) by refusing to give the 
statute the construction contended by the defendant and 
stating, 
" ... It might be made the means of serious mis-
chief if it could have such a construction." 
It is submitted that the lO"wer Court did not error 
m refusing to grant defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgment of plaintiff against defendant where such 
Motion was based upon plaintiff's noncompliance of Sec-
tion 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) in that the withdrawal of 
defendant's counsel was voluntar~T and the provisions of 
the quoted statute had no application to this case. 
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to practice in the Conrts and docs not apply to situations 
\\'here a voluntary withdn1Yrnl of counsel, for any reason 
occurs. 
In a lat0r Californ;a ca::;c, De Recut Corp. v. Dunn, 
242 Pac. 93G, 42 ALR 1:513, the Court quotes the New 
York law which reads yirtually tl1e same as the Utah 
law in that the need for advising the defendant to 
appoint new counsel only is reqnired where the attorney 
shall cease to act or shall be put out on the role of 
attorney. In other words, the fact that the attorney with-
draws from the case in point but is not disqualified from 
vracticing law within the state, does not require notice on 
the part of plaintiff to the defendant to appoint new 
counsel or to appear in person. 
In a New York case, Hendry v. Hilton, 127 N.Y.S. 
2d 454, in which the attorney was discharged by the 
client, the New York Court made the following state-
ment in discussing the N cw York statute, which is iden-
tical in most respects to the Utah statute, to-wit: 
"That section (240) does not relate to the re-
moval or suspension of any attorney from the 
case, or his disability to proceed therein, when 
such removal, suspension or disability is caused 
by the voluntary act of the attorney or client or 
both. This section relates solely to a removal, 
suspension or disability which is involuntary, 
which is personal to the attorney, and which 
effectually prevents him from continuing to act 
- assuming his ·willingness to continue. It con-
notes a force nojeure, ... " 
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apply where a11 attorney merely 1cithdra1cs from a case, 
and docs not wholly cease the pm ct ice of law. (Emphasis 
added.) The Supreme Court discussc's the section of law 
in question in the YanCott case a11d also examines de-
cisions of oth0r states ckaling with identical sections of 
their own laws. The Utah Supreme Court, in quoting 
from a Michigan case, said: 
"In Coon v. Plyrn011th Plank Road Co., 32 l\Iich. 
248 it was contended, as it is here, that the with-
drawal of the attorney took from the court the 
right to proceed with the trial of the case. l\Ir. 
Justice Cooley, after stating the contention of the 
appellant, and after setting forth the Michigan 
statute, which is like ours, in the course of the 
opinion said: 
'l:V e do not understand this to apply to a case 
where a practicing attorney for any reason de-
clines to go on with a particular case while still 
continuing in practice. It might be madf~ the 
means of serious mischief if it could have a con-
struction. rrhe plain meaning of the statute is to 
provide for cases in which the attorney or so-
licitor, by reason of death, disability, or other 
cause, has ceased to practice in the court. His 
refusal to proceed in a JHtrticular case is not ceas-
ing to act as such attorney or solicitor, .... ' ". 
(Emphasis added). 
The court cl<•arly indicates that tlH~ statute in qm•s-
tion is to apply to situations in whieh the attornev hv . ' ., 
reason of death, disability or otlic·r cans<', has ceased 
5 
counsel for plaintiff to take any action with respect to 
giving notice to the defendant to appoint another attor-
ney where the attorney for the defendant had withdrawn 
from the case voluntarily ·withont disqualification or 
disability. 
Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. (1953) provides as follows, 
to wit: 
"Notice to appoint snccessor.-When an attorney 
dies or is removed or suspended or ceases to act 
as such, the party to an action or proceeding for 
whom he was acting as attorney, must, before 
any further proceedings are had against him, be 
required by adverse party by written notice to 
appoint another attorney or to appear in person." 
Defendant docs not dispute the fact that the with-
drawal of Mr. Murphy was voluntary and not a result 
of death, or the removal or suspension of Mr. Murphy 
from the rolls as an attorney, or that Mr. Murphy ceased 
to act or practice as an attorney at the time of the with-
dawal. Therefore, the withdrawal of Mr. Murphy does 
not come within the provisions of the statute in question 
and the requirement of notice contained therein did not 
attach to plaintiff as contended by the defendant. 
In an early Utah case, Va11Cott, et al, v. Wall, 53 U. 
:282, 178 P. 42, the Utah Supreme Court in considering 
a case in which defendant fired his attorney and directed 
him to withdraw from the case, stated that the provisions 
uf the alJove quoted section of the Utah Code did 7iot 
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ample opportunity at that time to confor with his client, 
the plaintiff, concerning the n'cgmst of Mr. HadlPy. 
Plaintiff's attorney, E. H. Fankhauser, uot;fied de-
fendant's attorney, Skphcn :M. Hadley, on January 9, 
1967, by letter that he would Le unable to stipulate to 
the setting aside of the Default Judgment to plaintiff 
against defendant. :Mr. Hadley then filed a Motion to 
Set Aside the Default Judgment on plaintiff against 
defendant, on or about January 12, 19G7. This l\fotion 
was not noticed for hearing by defendant l!ntil May, 1967. 
Defendant admits receiving Notice of the ·with-
drawal of his counsel, James A. Murphy, the Notice of 
\Vithdrawal having been mailed to defendant at 530 East 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the same address to 
which all future Notices were mailed by plaintiff. ( J 
Affidavit of defendant paragraph No. 1.) 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDG-
MENT OF PLAINTIFF AGAINST DEFENDANT 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 78-51-36 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS AMENDED. 
It is the contention of plaintiff-respondent that the 
only issue to be decided upon appc~al it-> whether or not 
the provisions of Section 78-51-3G TT.C.A. (1953) rtq11ired 
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tiff or plaintiff's counsel, after such mailing to the last 
kno-wn address of defendant at 530 East Fifth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. That the Notice of Hearing of the 
Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer and enter a De-
fault Judgment against deft>ndant was in fact subse-
quently forwarded to the defendant. (f. Motion and 
Judgment by Default and Notice and mailing certificate 
therein.) ( g. Tl1e Order and mailing certificate con-
tained therein.) 
Defendant engaged other counsel, Stephen M. Had-
lc·y, who contacted plaintiff's connsel, E. H. Fankhauser, 
on or about December 6, 1966, with regard to the Default 
.Tndgment entered against defendant. Mr. Hadley repre-
sented to plaintiff's counsel, E. H. Fankhauser, that 
he had been contacted by the defendant with regard to 
tlte Judgment entered against defendant by plaintiff and 
that he was inquiring as to the nature and extent of said 
action. Mr. Hadley represented to plaintiff's counsel, 
at that time, that he did not know if he would represent 
the defendant and would notify plaintiff's counsel at 
~ome future time. J\.f r. Hadley, as defendant's attorney, 
again contacted plaintiff's attorney, by letter, dated De-
cember 20, 1966, requesting that plaintiff's attorney 
stipulate to the setting aside of the Default Judgment 
ol plaintiff against defendant. Defendant's attorney 
then assumed that plaintiff's attorney agreed in writing 
to stipulat<-~ to the setting aside of such Default J udg-
ment; however, defendant's attorney was mistaken in 
that plaintiff's attorrn•y, E. H. Fankhauser, had not had 
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ing, to commence snit against defendant for non-pay-
ment of such purchases and repairs to defendant's air-
planes; and for a check drawn by defendant, payable to 
plaintiff's assignor, drawn against insufficient funds. 
DISPOSITION IN Lff\VER COURT 
A default Judgment was granted plaintiff against 
defendant in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County for defendant's failure to answer 
Interrogatories propounded and served upon defendant 
by plaintiff in compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The defendant, pursuant to provisions of 
Chapter 78-51-36, filed a Motion to have the Default 
Judgment against defendant set aside, and the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Hon-
orable Marcellus K. Snow presiding, denied defendant's 
Motion. 
The appellant-defendant appealed from the Order 
of the said Court denying defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment of plaintiff against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is not entirely in agreement with 
the Statement of Facts set forth in the appellant's brief. 
'l1he Motion of plaintiff filed on or about November 16, 
1966, to Strike Defendant's Ansvver and enter a Default 
Judgment against defendant and N oticc~ of Hearing on 
said Motion was mailed to defendant and his former 
attorney, Mr. Murphy, and ",ras never returned to plain-
